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Abstract 
The article provides a case of community safety based upon an evaluative study of an 
community safety intervention in the south-west Dublin suburb of Tallaght. 
Characteristic of the Irish context for crime prevention and community safety has 
been the ad hoc nature of policy formation and the underdeveloped structures for 
urban security. The case is based primarily upon qualitative data from interviews and 
focus groups with key stakeholders, together with some additional observations from 
a household survey. The key themes centre on the way safety manifests from issues 
related to social integration in the pilot communities; the impact, capacity and 
potential of the local authority as an agent for urban security; the creative tension 
between evidence based approaches and practical problem solving; and the role of 
community safety workers’ local knowledge and autonomous action within the local 
authority structures.   
 
Keywords 
Urban security, community safety, crime prevention, local security governance, 
Ireland. 
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Introduction 
The article presents the case material from an evaluative study of a community safety 
initiative in south-west Dublin, outlining the role of the funder, the deployment of the 
cross agency team, and examples of the community level practices that were deployed.  
Critical lessons here relate to how safety manifests in social housing estates; and the 
role of the local authority, given its statutory responsibilities in Ireland in respect of 
housing and estate management, together with its statutory powers regarding anti-
social behaviour.  The Initiative in Tallaght West was made possible by the 
Childhood Development Initiative (CDI) a consortium of agencies and individuals 
working to improve services and outcomes for children. The case reveals the 
centrality of the local authority as a multi functional unit of local governance and its 
role in combining social prevention interventions together with situational measures 
in social housing contexts. Of interest here also is the minimal and understated role of 
the formal police organisation, An Garda Síochána, and hence revealing the ‘nodal’ 
nature of the governance of security (Shearing and Wood, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 
2007).  Community safety has many manifestations and labels depending upon the 
national context in which it is used.  Edwards et al (2013) note that the term ‘urban 
security’ in continental Europe captures a wide range of informal interventions in 
crime prevention and crime control.  In so far as ordering and security are functions of 
the governance of social space, and by virtue of its implied work in social integration 
and social cohesion as revealed in this case, the local state is a key actor in governing 
security beyond the criminal justice system.  
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Despite the literature emphasising the emergence of a ‘punitive turn’ and ‘cultures of 
control’ (Garland, 2001), the practice of community safety workers’ received 
attention for their capacity to act within both liberal and social democratic 
frameworks (Hughes and Gilling 2004; Hughes 2007). Moreover, the role of the 
community safety worker reflected a dilemma between mobilising agents for a ‘new 
moral cleansing’ as against enabling the formation of ‘radical cadres of transformative 
power’ (Hughes et al, 2002: 167).  Applying this in the Australian context, Cherney 
and Sutton (2004) noted that while the role of the Community Safety Officer was 
framed within the technical fix of ‘what works’, in practice their work focused much 
more on proactive problem-solving with a multiplicity of governing actors. They also 
noted the need for flexible and semi-autonomous work by de-emphasising law and 
order responses; and acting as catalysts to change mindsets towards practical 
resolutions. 
 
This article introduces case material from the Republic of Ireland - a relative 
latecomer to the community safety ball – to discuss some of these issues and to 
highlight some of the complexities and nuances revealed in the research. A first step 
is to set out some characteristics of the Irish context, followed by the empirical 
material from the Tallaght West Community Safety Initiative study.   
 
Key Aspects of the Irish Context 
Documenting the development of crime prevention and community safety in the 
Republic of Ireland, Bowden and Topping (2016) outline that the ‘preventive turn’ 
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(Hughes, 2007) has had a bottom-up, and indeed a middle-out quality based upon a 
combination of pragmatic reforms in care and welfare systems. Indeed developments 
in crime prevention and locally based informal crime control stem from a variety of 
sources. For example, the closure of Industrial Schools in the 1970s gave rise to a 
greater diffusion of social prevention initiatives (Sargent 2014; Bowden and Topping 
2016); youth crime and disorder prevention in urban peripheral neighbourhoods 
emerged in direct response to problems associated with youth disorder in urban 
periphery in the 1990s (Bowden 2006; Bowden 2014; Bowden and Higgins, 2000).  
The National Drug Strategy, initiated in 1996 as a response to two definable heroin 
epidemics in Dublin (peaking first in 1983 and a later peak in 1995), has also been a 
key player in prevention and safety measures through a network of Local Drugs Task 
Forces (Bowden and Topping, 2016).  On balance while there is increasing activity in 
both crime prevention and community safety, they have been germinated in a variety 
of domains: in urban regeneration; estate management; and early childhood 
interventions (Gilling et al, 2013).  
 
In the Irish context, questions of social order in social housing estates remain a critical 
issue for planners and managers.  Research by Fahey (1999) and more recently by 
O’Gorman (2014) also highlight that nuisance and disorder are key factors shaping 
quality of life and determining the success or failure of social housing developments.  
Previous state interventions in the Irish context such as incentives to enable tenants to 
purchase houses and relinquish their tenancies have contributed much to disorder by 
removing most economically stable tenants from estates (O’Connell and Fahey 1999; 
Hourigan 2011).   
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During the 1990s and 2000s a number of local development initiatives were 
established under a combination of support from the Irish government and the 
European Commission that were directly focused upon countering social exclusion.  
One of these developments the RAPID programme (Revitalising Areas Through 
Planning, Investment and Development) channelled Irish exchequer funding to the 
most disadvantaged areas in the State between 2002 and 2010.  A key dimension of 
RAPID, which was implemented by local authorities, was to propose strategies to 
deal with anti-social behaviour and to promote community safety (Bowden and 
Topping, 2016).   
 
While policy formation has been somewhat indolent, reforms were included in police 
legislation giving a greater participatory role to local authorities and communities in 
crime prevention and community safety.  The Garda Síochána Act 2005 set out two 
foundational pillars that form a potential structure for supporting the development of 
crime prevention and community safety.  The first are Joint Policing Committees 
(JPCs) that are tasked to analyse crime and anti-social behaviour and advise local 
authorities and the police on strategies to address them.  The second are Local 
Policing Fora (LPFs) which operate at local neighbourhood level and involve 
communities, local authorities and police working in partnership to engage in joint 
responses to crime and community safety problems (Bowden and Topping, 2016).  
Neither of these two emergent structures have been subject to systematic review or 
evaluation and so their impact remains unknown, although there is some evidence that 
relationships across sectors have been fraught (Harrington, 2011). 
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The Case: Childhood Development Initiative - Community Safety Initiative in 
Tallaght West 
After briefly outlining the methodology used and describing the main stakeholders, 
the case material is presented around five organising pillars. The first concerns the 
context for the Initiative and how the promoters learned hard lessons from previous 
attempts to design and implement a model of community safety.  The second will 
discuss the complexities of what is constructed as issues of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ 
which result from wider social stresses: lack of support services; racial and ethnic 
tensions associated with new in-fill housing developments added to established 
working class neighbourhoods.  A third pillar of the case material briefly outlines the 
differences in approaches and mechanisms deployed in two distinct pilot sites.  
Zooming in on the implementation of the Initiative constitutes the fourth part of the 
organising framework.  This pillar will centre on the impact of the Initiative as it 
engaged with the local authority structure together with the issues of creative tension 
between autonomy and standardised, manual-centred approaches.  The case concludes 
by reflecting on the roles of both the local authority and the public police in respect of 
implementing the Initiative. 
 
Methodology 
The case is based upon a post hoc evaluation study commissioned by the Childhood 
Development Initiative.  The article is based upon findings from interviews with 
stakeholders and focus groups with service providers and members of the local 
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community.  A household survey of the two sites where the Initiative was piloted is 
briefly referred to but not substantially utilised in this particular discussion.  The 
Initiative was implemented between 2011 and 2012 and the evaluation commissioned 
a year later.  Fieldwork was carried out during the Autumn of 2013 and a final report 
was later published by the commissioning body, the Childhood Development 
Initiative (Bowden, 2015).  An earlier phase of the Initiative was implemented in the 
period 2009 to 2011 and subject to a separate evaluation.  A timeline setting out these 
distinct stages is summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Timeline for implementing the Tallaght West Community Safety Initiative, 
phases 1 and 2 
 Programme Implementation 
agencies 
Key evaluation 
finding 
 
Evaluator 
Phase 1 
2009-11 
Anti-social 
behaviour 
contracts in 
two pilot sites 
CDI directly 
delivers 
Initiative 
No behaviour 
contracts used – 
problems with 
community 
engagement 
Child and Family 
Research Centre, 
National 
University of 
Ireland Galway -   
Report 2013 
 
 
Phase 2 
2011-12 
Customised 
responses in 
two new pilot 
sites 
CDI, Local 
authority 
‘RAPID’ staff 
Highlighted 
proactive role of 
local authority 
and its staff as 
agents of 
community 
safety 
Dublin Institute of 
Technology 
 
Evaluation 
research 2013 to 
2014 
 
Report Published 
2015 
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The researcher utilised a mixed methods tool kit within the realistic evaluation 
framework (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  Hence the research examined context (the 
conditions in the setting that require the introduction of measures / actions); 
mechanisms (the rationale and resources used to cause effects in the context) and 
outcomes (the practical effects generated by the mechanisms). This approach is 
similar to the linear assumptions of logic models which examine the flow between 
resources, activities, outputs and outcomes (Cooksy, et al 2001). However the short 
time frame for the Initiative did not auger well for producing definable outcomes.  
The evaluation aimed therefore, following Tilley (2009), to identify progress towards 
achieving outcomes. 
 
With each interview or ‘speech event’ the researcher engaged in ongoing frame 
analysis using the method of strip resolution, which involves gaining understanding of 
the connections between the actors, actions and relationships by resolving questions 
with participants (Agar, 1996). Becker’s (1979) guiding principles for qualitiative 
data analysis were used to identify intense themes: participants’ accounts of the 
Initiative generated a conceptual map and an overview of the actions taken. 
 
The mixed methods tool kit involved three main elements including a series of semi-
structured interviews with key stakeholders; a community survey of perceptions of 
residents in two pilot sites; and a series of three focus groups in the two sites as in 
Table 2. Interviews were primarily conducted with key stakeholder agencies and 
focus groups were organized for frontline staff and residents in the pilot sites. The 
latter were designed to triangulate findings from stakeholder interviews and the 
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household survey. Participants were asked to comment on emerging findings in order 
to verify the substantive themes emerging.  
Table 2: Summary of Research Methods Used 
Method Number 
 
Qualitative interviews with key 
stakeholders 
 
15 participants 
Household survey 
 
86 households 
Focus groups x 3 12 participants 
 
There are key limitations to the research arising from the fieldwork. Focus groups 
were limited by under attendance and a focus group organised for one of the pilot 
sites did not take place. This limited the researcher’s capacity to fully assess in detail 
the relationships between residents and service providers in this site. In addition, the 
evaluation research is a retrospective study and commenced almost 15 months after 
the Initiative had been implemented. This shaped what respondents were able to 
report, given the passage of time between implementation and the fieldwork. The 
household survey, which is not substantially reported in this particular article, was 
also limited in this respect and therefore it was difficult to link specific mechanisms 
with perceived changes in quality of life.  
The Key Stakeholders 
The Childhood Development Initiative (CDI) began in 2003 to plan a strategy to 
improve child and family outcomes in Tallaght West and from 2007 to 2013 was one 
of three early intervention and prevention programmes supported by public and 
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philanthropic funding.  Prior to the foundation of the CDI, a research project into the 
needs and development challenges in the area, was carried out by the Dartington 
Social Research Unit (Axford et al, 2004). The CDI has since become part of the Irish 
Government’s Area Based Childhood Initiative and it has since 2007 piloted and 
evaluated a number of interventions including community safety (see www.twcdi.ie).  
For the Community Safety Initiative, the CDI’s Community Engagement Team (CET) 
brought together local stakeholders including housing associations, community 
groups, individual community leaders, estate management workers, the police service, 
and the Youth Service as summarised in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Roles of main stakeholders 
Agency Role 
 
Local Authority RAPID 
Staff 
Assessed needs in sites; implemented community safety 
action plan; participated in Community Engagement 
Team (CET) with CDI staff 
 
Childhood Development 
Initiative (CDI) 
Funder; co-ordinated the task team (CET); 
commissioned external evaluation 
 
Youth Service 
 
Implemented youth initiative in the Fettercairn site but 
not in Killinarden  
 
Police Service – An Garda 
Síochána 
Participated in local steering groups in pilot sites; visited 
young people’s homes in Fettercairn site 
 
Community Actors 
 
Integrated residents into community services; 
participated in pilot site steering groups 
 
Housing Association 
(landlord in Killinarden 
site) 
Participated in activities and steering groups in 
Killinarden site 
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The South Dublin County Council (SDCC) is one of the newest local authorities in 
Ireland following the division of Dublin County into three distinct areas under the 
Local Government Act 1994.  The new local authority structures were formed to take 
account of changes in population following a period of sustained housing 
development on rezoned agricultural land and a process of population dispersal from 
the city centre to the periphery from the 1970s (MacLaren and Punch 2004; Punch 
2002).  The SDCC area has a population of 0.265m (2011 census).  Like all local 
authorities in the country, it is responsible for housing, planning, environmental 
health, parks, roads and traffic, and community services and development.   
 
The Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development Programme 
(RAPID) was a local development programme to counter disadvantage in local 
communities and was co-ordinated by local authorities.  The RAPID Programme 
wound down in 2010 and is no longer funded by the Government. A key focus for 
RAPID was working in partnership in local communities on issues including 
community safety and anti-social behaviour (Pobal, 2016).  Local authority staff of 
the SDCC previously assigned to RAPID were temporarily redeployed on a part-time 
basis to the Community Safety Initiative in agreement with CDI. 
 
Phase 1 of the Tallaght West Community Safety Initiative, 2009-2011 
The assignment of the RAPID co-ordinators was conceived as Phase 2 of 
implementing the Community Safety Initiative from 2011 to 2012.  Phase 1 was the 
subject of an evaluation by researchers at The Child and Family Research Centre, at 
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National University of Ireland Galway (NUIG) (Kearns et al, 2013). Particular 
attention in the NUIG report focused upon the implementation of a Community 
Safety Contract, a technology transferred from the UK.  However no contracts were 
implemented between 2008 and 2011: the authors suggested that this mechanism 
precluded stakeholder input into designing safety interventions to meet local problems 
in the target areas (Kearns et al 2013; Bowden 2015).   
 
Having reassessed the learning from the first phase of the Initiative, the CDI took two 
critical steps towards mainstreaming it with existing structures and services:   
1.  Developed a Community Safety Manual to guide policy and practice; 
2. Opened negotiations with the local authority with the view to deploying their staff 
to implement Phase 2 in two pilot neighbourhoods.  
 
The Manual outlined the essential elements of a community safety strategy that could 
be adapted and replicated and offered a guide towards assisting neighbourhoods and 
stakeholders to adopt an evidence-based approach together with a framework for local 
participation. The Initiative’s logic model or programme theory pointed out six 
aspects of the model specifying how key leaders would be identified; assessing 
community readiness; engaging the community; developing local steering groups; 
carrying out a safety audit and action plan (CDI, 2013). 
 
The Complexities of “Safety”: Manifestations and Impact in the Chosen Pilot Sites  
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Using the Manual and local knowledge, two pilot sites were selected in 2011.  Both 
sites were in-fill housing developments, constructed within or on the boundaries of, 
existing council housing.  This meant that they had distinct demographic and spatial 
characteristics.  In both sites, housing was allocated from the local authority housing 
waiting lists – residents of these new sites are drawn from a wide geographical area 
and had different mobility patterns to those of the host communities.  
 
1. The Killinarden site consisted of 104 recently constructed houses facing a mature 
housing estate: most of the households had very young children, compared with the 
host neighbourhood which was built in the early 1980s and had substantially matured. 
To its rear was a relatively new estate of mixed tenure housing. 
2. The Fettercairn site of approximately 100 dwellings was more ethnically and 
racially heterogeneous than its host neighbourhood. These distinctions were reported 
to be particularly marked in the Fettercairn site which had a higher concentration of 
households of African origin.   
 
Both sites were consistently described in interviews as “interface areas”: they might 
be regarded as interfaces between the old and the new versions of community in 
contemporary urban Ireland.  The Initiative was working with new sources of tension 
and conflict as dimensions of safety: 
We picked those two estates because they were relatively new both of them as 
pilot sites. And there were particular issues in Fettercairn in that there was a 
peculiar mixture of tenants.  There was a feeling that there was racism going 
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on there.  There was in particular migrants from African countries and also 
from eastern European countries.  So there was a feeling that the existing 
houses, beside the new estate were feeling put upon and maybe a little… I 
don’t know there was a lot of comparing going on.  So there was a little bit of 
racism bubbling up and that’s why we picked there (SDCC staff 3). 
 
In addition the ‘interface’ constituted the boundary lines between largely homogenous 
working class communities whose residents originated from the post 1970s 
population dispersal from the inner city (Bowden 2014; Punch 2002; Byrne, 1984) 
and a new diverse group in need of social housing including migrants from Europe 
and Africa.  The issue of safety in these two sites was therefore highly challenging 
because they were complicated by issues of class, race and ethnicity.  While both 
areas were chosen on the basis of different manifestations of ‘anti-social behaviour’ 
there was some realisation amongst the stakeholders that they were dealing with more 
complex issues. These differences shaped and also limited the impact of the responses 
that were mobilised (see Table 4 below for a summary of the different interventions in 
each site). 
 
These factors seemed to speak to distinct issues of relative insecurity: the experiences 
of people living at the Killinarden site manifested in a sense of isolation and 
separation from surrounding estates.  The residents were seen to live with this 
problem of being neither one nor the other, as if reflecting life on the interface. An 
established and respected community leader pointed out: 
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[T]hey are still part of your community.  It’s not another estate.  Half of them 
are considered [old council estate].  There’s different entrances – the entrance 
to the pilot site is through [the old council estate] but if you are in a car you 
can’t access the rest of [new mixed tenure estate] you’d have to come in from 
[another entrance].  The roads are subdivided.  They are part of A but you 
have to go in through B.  Do you understand? – subtle.  And then does that 
cause ‘well I live in A but you have to come in through B’.  Do you know 
what I am saying – just subtle differences (Key Community Stakeholder, 
Killinarden Site). 
 
In addition the new estates constituted distinct time-spaces when compared with the 
older estates: the capacity to participate is structured by labour market participation, 
as one service provider observed: 
In new estates people are out at work and they are not back ‘til 7 or 8 in the 
evening.  It can be a hard thing.  People [in the old estates] had the lack of 
facilities in the 70s and 80s to unite them.  That’s not there now.  People are 
out at work and it can be hard to get them involved in the community (Key 
Stakeholder, Killinarden Site). 
 
This complicates the basis of commonality between distinct groups of residents whose 
relationship to place is multiply distinguished by employment, mobility and migration. 
Thus community safety workers in this context were dealing with the implementation 
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of housing policy and its social effects such as marginality, feelings of exclusion, 
resentment of the Other.  Focus group data with stakeholders in the Fettercairn site 
revealed this issue clearly: 
 
Participant  
1: I remember probably going back a couple years ago there was some 
ASB started around the parade maybe by residents of the older houses.  
The young people (.) sparked by what you said, people got these new 
houses facing on to the old houses that were looking so attractive.  That 
did create tension in the area.  And ASB started to pick up. 
3: As [name] said there the people looking over – the first thing they 
probably notice is that there is lots of non-nationals in there you know 
and sometimes the non-nationals have been a bit of an easy target, 
because they don’t know their way around or they don’t know whose 
the local young lads are. 
 
MB: They don’t have roots in the area? 
 
3: They don’t have roots in the area.  Where ever they came from 
different parts of Ireland even.  So definitely they were targeted. 
 
2: Combined with that there is a sense of injustice maybe that you are 
looking across at the new facility. 
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3: Yeah, yeah and the jealousy factor and they are looking over and 
saying in their head ‘well these people are coming in from outside the 
country and they are getting a brand new house and I’m here in a leaky 
house’.  There was definitely a bit of that going on. 
 
The needs and issues in the Killinarden site had to do with helping neighbours to 
develop informal bonds with one another.  The assumption here was that without 
these ties households would remain isolated: they would live in highly individualised 
patterns that were counter to constructing ‘soft’ surveillance, as might be expected in 
established communities. These complexities reveal the broad range of contributing 
factors to settling social housing developments, underlining the role of the local 
authority as a major provider and governor in this context. 
 
Differences in Mechanisms and Impact in Both Sites 
A household survey taken in the two neighbourhoods (n=86) asking respondents if 
they perceived that there was a change in the estate in respect of crime, vandalism and 
various nuisance behaviours, revealed a more strongly felt sense of change between 
the areas.  The research design and timeframe limited the extent to which an 
association could be made between the distinct results and the different mechanisms 
deployed in each site.  In Killinarden where there was less direct micro level 
anticrime interventions and more community identity-building events, residents felt 
there was little or no change.   
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In contrast almost two-thirds of respondents in the Fettercairn site perceived a fall in 
anti-social behaviour while there was no perceived change in racism.  However it is 
understood from an analysis of mechanisms used by local authority staff in 
Fettercairn, that more focused and customised, community and individual household 
situational measures.  In addition, working with the Youth Service, the Initiative 
funded additional inputs with a group of young people seen as being the source of the 
unwanted behaviours. The Fettercairn site therefore had a higher concentration and a 
broader spread of interventions compared with the Killinarden site summarised in 
Table 4. 
Table 4: Key safety Issues, agencies mobilised and principal measures undertaken in 
the two pilot sites. 
 Killinarden Site 
(100 dwellings) 
Fettercairn Site  
(100 dwellings) 
 
Manifestation of Safety 
Issues 
Isolation of residents 
Lack of belonging 
Nuisance behaviours 
Racially based anti-social 
behaviour 
Congregations of young 
people outside new 
dwellings 
Nuisance experienced by 
Particular residents  
 
Key Agencies and 
Partners Mobilised 
Local authority staff 
Housing association 
Residents 
Community centre 
CDI 
Youth service 
Police 
Local authority anti-social 
unit staff 
Community centre 
CDI  
 
Situational Measures General environmental & 
aesthetic improvements to 
front gardens, green areas, 
walkways 
Fencing, alley gates, 
chains for wheelie bins 
Customised solutions for 
individual households e.g. 
CCTV, creating fenced 
front gardens 
 
Social Measures Christmas and Halloween 
parties, street barbeques and 
community events to 
encourage neighbourliness 
Funding for a youth 
service intervention with 
young people deemed ‘anti 
social’ 
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Implementation of the Initiative  
Entering the Local Development Domain: Mobilising the Local Authority 
The CDI used its funding to contract with the local authority to deploy staff, who had 
worked on RAPID, to the Community Safety Initiative.  In this way the CDI levered 
time and autonomy.  A CDI team member said:   
 
A frontline worker wouldn’t agree to do anything without checking back four 
times with somebody else.  I felt sorry for anybody working at that level in the 
Council because it was just impossible.  They had no autonomy.  But also you 
can’t freely co-operate with other people unless they have that kind of 
autonomy.  (Member of CDI Team, 1). 
 
The CDI recognised however that RAPID staff already had a wider network of 
contacts both internally in the local authority structures and in the community.  In this 
sense the Community Safety Initiative was successful at forming a governing node: it 
enabled a horizontally and vertically integrated team to be put in place; and who had a 
clear mandate to ‘zoom in’ on safety issues.  A senior council official described what 
the Initiative enabled was a more ‘conversational’ form of governing, as against an 
enforcement model.  In addition, he pointed out that the Initiative was integrated into 
the work of the local council team: 
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Rather than sitting around the table they were able to get out there and have 
that conversation.  People need a voice and they need to be given a chance to 
do it separately – if they don’t want it done publically. [The RAPID officers] 
can go out and have the conversation and feed it back into the Council team.  
CDI brings together the co-ordination of that. The RAPID has better contact 
outside the meetings; by having that conversation – its important how you 
deliver things – how you communicate (Senior SDCC Staff 1). 
 
The Initiative was implemented by a cross-agency task-team which was comprised of 
the RAPID co-ordinators (local authority staff) and staff of the CDI.  The respective 
staff managers in the local authority and the CDI provided line management.  
Neighbourhood steering groups in the two pilot sites also supported the Initiative.  
These were comprised of key local actors including estate management workers, 
community Garda, local people, and the Youth Service.  In this way the Initiative was 
linked both vertically and horizontally in the context of the local authority and in the 
local community.  Thus an embedded autonomy was achieved: a softening of strict 
and rigid bureaucratic governance enabling a developmental flexibility, similar to that 
achieved by state agencies as actors in economic development (Evans 1995; O’Riain, 
2000) 
 
Tension Between Autonomy and Manualised, Evidence-Based Approaches 
Despite the many gains that the implementation of the Initiative made there remained 
a number of tense areas that need to be considered in advancing the community safety 
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model.  These issues related to working within in a results-oriented or outcome-
focused approach; versus those less time bound and process-oriented.  Moreover they 
appear to point to the creative tensions that exist between different institutional 
cultures and developmental models. 
 
This was revealed in the view expressed by some local authority staff that the work 
they did, despite the funding, the manual and the cross agency task-team, was no 
different to the community based work they did as part of their normal routines.  
Recognising that the earlier phase of the Initiative, which did not prove successful in 
achieving its goals, and with specific reference to the community safety contract, as a 
local authority staff member pointed out: 
 
Yeah.  We had no interest flogging that dead horse.  It just was a bad idea.  
…So we went in knowing that we were just going to do things our own way.  
CDI want to make things look like it’s new it’s a new initiative you know.  
Brand new idea.  Never done before……It’s just the same old community 
development that happens here all the time you know.  There’s nothing new 
about it.  But what was new was maybe was the dedicated time and a 
concentrated (.) small space (SDCC staff 3). 
 
This perception seems to suggest that there was a tension between the evidence based 
model in the Community Safety Manual, and the working knowledge of the local 
authority workers.  Some research in this area of tension reveals the importance of 
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working together on concrete tasks and partners getting to know one another (Mayan 
et al, 2016).  Manualised, evidence-based models might have to remain suitably 
flexible to activate the embedded autonomy of the community safety worker as a 
practical problem-solver. 
 
The Community Safety Worker within the Local Authority Structure 
The Initiative was jointly governed by a memorandum of understanding between the 
CDI and the local authority (SDCC).  The senior local authority manager responsible 
deployed RAPID staff to the Initiative for an agreed term of one year. In the 
evaluation study the local authority participants pointed to enhanced learning on 
collaborative approaches, as a senior official pointed out: 
You can take it this is how we are going to work.  We have done it since in 
[housing estate], we had problems up there.  There was a couple of families 
with problems and there was nothing being done.  We moved some people 
[staff] up to talk to them and we set up an environmental group a community 
safety group and the events group and it solved the problem (Senior SDCC 
staff 1). 
 
The Initiative also helped SDCC senior staff to think about the person specification 
for a community safety professional who resolves problems by joining up the 
contributions of dispersed actors through intra and inter agency linkages, while 
developing a profile of trust locally. This is a role for a professional with 
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communicative capacity to integrate an official role, an action-oriented approach and 
community networking skills: 
Yes you need a person who works – the right type of person who can use 
supports of other departments to get things done and not a punitive person 
giving out fines – someone who people will be glad to see coming along.  
Someone has to gather up all the problems in an area – list them and throw it 
in and then you have a piece of paper that’s going to hop from one desk to 
another – there’s got to be a connect (Senior Local Authority Manager). 
 
Police Engagement and Involvement with the Initiative 
Through the Joint Policing Committee, local authority and An Garda Síochána 
implemented a series of crime prevention and community safety actions throughout 
Tallaght and South Dublin County.  While the Community Safety Initiative had local 
police input, it operated with minimal involvement from police management. At the 
implementation level however community Garda, an officer dedicated to locally 
based problem solving in the Fettercairn site, was a member of the steering committee 
in one of the pilot sites and had day-to-day contact with the implementation of the 
Initiative.  A Garda sergeant and a Council official were also involved in visiting 
homes of young people to underline to parents the statutory powers available to the 
Council should incivilities persist.  The goal of this intervention was to encourage 
young people to engage with the Youth Service through its Garda Youth Diversion 
Project. Apart from these two discrete inputs, the Initiative operated without input 
from police management.  
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Discussion 
Commenting on safety and security in former Yugoslav republics Meško et al (2013) 
have pointed to the deeper roots of safety as critical dimensions shaping urban 
security and insecurity.  Sources of insecurity and threat include economic decline, 
precarity in employment, alongside issues of crime and incivility. These issues 
experienced in the neighbourhoods may manifest in practical issues of safety but are 
related to marginality, change and absence of social cohesion.  This poses the 
challenge of choosing the right mechanisms within logic models for dealing with 
underlying complexities as well as their manifestations.  A universal challenge 
therefore is whether community safety is the right fix to urban marginality? However, 
using a mix of situational and social measures as in the case of the Fettercairn site in 
particular shows some progress towards a model that is inclusive and participative.  In 
this neighbourhood, individuals and sites were selected for customised environmental 
crime prevention measures alongside integrating young people more closely with the 
preventive activities of the Youth Service.   
 
The research highlights the proactive role that the local authority played in this case, 
and that of the originator and devisor of the Initiative, the CDI.  The Initiative 
mobilised customised security and preventive responses that appeared to be critical in 
the impact of the Initiative in the Fettercairn site especially.  This proactive role of the 
local authority enabled local security with accountability through problem solving and 
civic engagement.  The approach runs counter to the politics of ‘making people 
behave’ which characterised the ASBO driven policy on low-level crime control in 
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the UK during the 1990s and early 2000s (Burney, 2009).  Such approaches ‘defined 
deviancy up’ and set in place a self-regulatory politics; it failed to understand how 
regulation works in interaction with the wider sets of institutions and informal 
controls that regulate behaviour (Lewis, et al 2016).  The proactive approach shown in 
the case, is qualitatively different from the use of legislative orders to remove or 
chastise problem tenants.  Despite having access to such instruments available under 
the Housing Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act 1997, the SDCC has been a 
willing partner in a practice of engagement as stimulated by the designers and 
promoters of the Tallaght West Community Safety Initiative.  The use of both 
situational and social measures targeted at young people underline the need for 
integrated preventive ecosystems such as that piloted by the CDI. 
 
Glancey et al (2012) have pointed to the multiplicity of roles played in the context of 
Community Safety Officers (CSOs) in the local authorities in New South Wales 
highlighting that played in the formulation of crime prevention plans.  A proactive 
role designing out crime and developing responses to areas such as domestic violence 
and social prevention with young people are also dimensions of the CSO role in New 
South Wales.  Despite the emergence of a number of initiatives in the Irish context, 
there remains little clarity of focus and little by way of developing support structures 
for community safety and urban security as mainstream functions of government.   
 
By virtue of its remit in respect of social housing in the Irish context, local authorities 
are poised to deliver a more responsive model of government in areas most distant 
from power centres.  Housing agencies might be seen as more responsive in following 
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up on issues of nuisance and unwanted behaviours (Brown and Evans, 2014) and 
poised also to co-ordinate inclusive and collaborative strategies for ‘co-designing’ out 
crime (Camacho Durate, 2013).  
 
Conclusion 
Local authorities have increasingly become players in governing urban security, 
partly in response to the United Nations initiatives such as the Safer Cities 
Programme (United Nations Habitat, 2012).  Despite this framework, little discussion 
has taken place in the Irish context as to how this manifests itself in the everyday life 
of constructing safety in neighbourhoods. This article highlighted the role that local 
authorities play in mobilising community safety work, together with an account of the 
community safety worker as a problem solving agent of local governance; responding 
to aspects of the local context that contribute to crime, insecurity and incivilities.  
This approach reflects a distinct type of knowledge that is in tension with the ‘what 
works’, evidence based discourse.  Cherney and Sutton (2004) described this as 
‘know-how knowledge’ (as knowing how governing works and understanding how to 
transform it); and ‘know-who knowledge’ as network mobilization to help solve 
problems.  However rather than being the radical agent of transformative change 
(Hughes et al, 2002) the community safety workers in this case speak more to the 
power of embedded autonomy to make bureaucratic structures more flexible and 
governance more responsive. 
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The case presented also highlights the nature of incivilities as resulting from mis-
perceived advantages to ethnic and racial minority tenants.  Part of the work of 
community safety in the Fettercairn site in particular was sensitive to the tensions of 
integrating tenants from minorities into neighbourhoods, which had for generations, 
housed the white working class.  This potentially brings community safety policies 
and practice out of the domain of behaviour regulation and into that of social cohesion.  
Indeed managing the tensions at the neighbourhood level as observed in this case 
frames community safety and urban security with its related toolkits as part of the 
frontline work of social integration. 
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